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ABSTRACT
Corporate governance has become a bonafide subset of company’s law that is concerned
with who directs the company and for whose benefit. Its application varies in countries
found in the main legal jurisdictions of common and civil law. This thesis identifies these
differences by highlighting national corporate governance systems existing in Germany,
Japan, United Kingdom and United States. Together, these countries represent systems
adopted by several countries located on all continents. Increased cross border investment
in this era of globalization has been significantly affected by these governance systems.
The thesis shows the reasons why investors, multinational corporations and nations have
put corporate governance on their agenda’s. The thesis also discusses the theory of
convergence, which predicts that competition will eventually cause the various national
governance systems to converge into a single model. Finally, the attempt to create this
single model by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development is
explored.

INDEX WORDS: Shareholders, Directors, Corporate Governance, Corporations,
Companies, Institutional Investors, International Investors,
Multinational Corporations and Globalization.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The corporation, probably more than any other influence, is the organizational form that
conditions the nature and quality of people’s lives, whether or not they work for one1 .
People have predominantly turned to corporations to achieve economic success as well as
for many other purposes 2 .

Similarly at a national level, in most economies, corporate

enterprises play a critical role in shaping economic outcomes through the decisions they
make about investments, employment, and trade and income distribution3 .
Indeed it has been boldly suggested that today corporations are effectively more
powerful than governments4 . Whether they are or not is arguable, but this suggestion led
the writers mind to deduce that perhaps ‘corporate governance’ is a term not very
different from ‘good governance’ which is commonly used to describe the positive
attributes of democratic nations. In both scenarios‘, there are institutions to be governed,
persons vying for elected office and the exercise of universal suffrage. The difference lies
in semantics. When discussing corporate governance, instead of a country to be
1

Courtney C. Brown, Putting The Corporate Board To Work 3 (1976).
Id.
3
Mary O’Sullivan, Corporate Governance and Globalization, 570 annals am. acad. poll. & soc.
sci. 153, 154 (2000).
4
Jon Ralls,Corporate governance-who cares? International fund Strategies, (visited April 22
2002) http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/jon/ifs/9706_cvr.htm.
2
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governed, there is a corporation at stake. Where one would normally have politicians
vying for office, we have directors and the electorate is comprised of hundreds or perhaps
thousands of shareholders. In short, corporate governance becomes to a corporation what
good governance is to a nation.
The origin of the word ‘governance’ comes from the Latin word ‘gubernare’
which means to rule or steer5 . A defined governance structure is necessary whether the
body in question is a nation, state, town, professional society or business corporation.
Corporate governance, in particular, is concerned with the processes by which corporate
entities are governed. That is the exercise of power over the direction of the enterprise,
the supervision and control of executive actions, the concern for the effect of the entity on
the other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and the regulation of the
corporation within the jurisdiction in which it operates6 .
In their 1932 publication of

'The Modern Corporation and Private Property‘,

Berle and Means developed a model of publicly held corporations that set the terms of
the modern debate of corporate governance7 . In this influential book8 , the authors
asserted that while the law treated shareholders as the owners of a company, investors in

5

R. I. Tricker, Corporate Governance – Practices, Procedures and Powers in British Companies
and their Boards of Directors 9 (1984).
6
Id. at 8.
7
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Governance of the New Enterprises, in
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 201 (Xavier Vives eds., 2000).
8
To read discussions on corporate governance vis-à-vis the Berles and Means theory on the
public corporation see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 Harv. J.
L. & Pol’y 671, 674(1995); Craig LaChance, Nature v. Nature: Evolution, Path Dependence and
Corporate Governance, 18 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 279, 281(2001); Brian R. Cheffins, Current
Trends in Corporate Governance: Going From London to Milan Via Toronto 10 duke j. comp. &
int’l l. 5, 13(1999); BROWN, supra note 1, at xix.
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public corporations usually did not act in the manner one would expect of an owner. The
reason being that stock was owned by many dispersed shareholders none of who owned
enough shares to impact on the management. Instead shareholders allowed management
to deal with matters of importance and run the company, resulting in the separation of
ownership and control9 . In short the book showed how professional managers were not
accountable to the owners. This scholarship pointed to the narrow view of corporate
governance, which was how to ensure that managers followed the interest of
shareholders. However a broader definition of corporate governance in which the
interests of the corporations many stakeholders, beyond just the shareholders, are taken
into account is gaining ground10 .
In the legal realm corporate governance has now developed as a separate and
definable area of corporation law, which applies to many different types of companies
and industries11 . Although it started to develop in places like the US in the 1970`s12 , by
the early 1990’s it was still considered fairly new in most parts of the world13 but by the
late 1990‘s it was a major and contentious issue in both advanced and developing
economies14 . It was soon appearing on international agendas15 . Currently, the subject has

9

Cheffins, supra note 8.
Xavier Vives, Corporate Governance: Does it matter?, in Theoretical and Empirical
Perspectives 1 (Xavier Vives eds., 2000).
11
Peter Rodger, Corporate Governance in the Global Mutual Fund Industry, 28 Int’l Bus. Law.
243 (2000).
12
Details of the development of corporate governance in the United States are given in Chapter 3.
infra. P. 18.
13
Kevin Keasey et al, Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Analysis 2 (Kevin Keasey
et al, eds., 1997).
14
O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 153.
15
Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Towards a Cross-Culture Theory of
Corporate Governance Systems, 26 del. j. corp. l. 147, 151 (2001).
10

3

become increasingly important not only from a legal standpoint, but as a multi
disciplinary subject of economics, business ethics and politics16 .
The boundaries of corporate governance have long been a standing topic of debate
as have issues concerning its importance and application. A lot of legal jurisdictions have
developed their own standards. One possible explanation has been due to divergent
economic, political and historic backgrounds17 . As trade barriers fall, markets expand and
technology advances it has become easier for investors to invest in corporations in
foreign countries18 . This has resulted in the flexibility of local governance practices that
are changing to accommodate global trends19 .
Currently there are number of contemporary issues going on in this field. One
debate is which system of corporate governance is better and how can they be improved
with codes of best conduct20 . Another issue is the growing pressure on national corporate
governance systems to merge especially in light of integrated financial markets21 . A
theory of convergence predicts that national governance systems will eventually merge
into one model22 . Ahead of this theory is an attempt to ‘globalize’ corporate governance
through ‘universal’ principles adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development23 .
16

Vives, supra note 10.
Licht, supra note 15, at 148.
18
Cheffins, supra note 8, at 5.
19
Id.
20
Vives, supra note 10, at 1.
21
O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 154.
22
Ronald Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49
Am.J.Comp.L.329, 329- 356 (2001).
23
International Corporate Governance Network (visited April 24.2002)
www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm
17
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This thesis draws from the debate of all these current issues. Its main aim is
twofold. Firstly it studies the national corporate governance systems that have been
adopted by different countries and distinguishes the elements of each system. The two
dominant governance models are the market-oriented model found in Anglo-Saxon
countries and the bank/labor model found in continental Europe and Japan24 . This thesis
shall examine the characteristics of these models in selected countries. A study will also
be done of what is possibly the first attempt to ‘globalize’ corporate governance through
principles formulated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.
(OECD). The second aim is to study the implications of these national corporate
governance systems and the global system on investors, multinational corporations and
other countries. This is particularly important in this era of technological and
telecommunication revolution when it has become easier for investors to invest in
corporations located in different countries and continents. In a nutshell this is the
theoretical framework of this thesis.
The second chapter will explore the various definitions of corporate governance
and will attempt to condense, into a single chapter features and issues that have shaped
ideas on governance as a legal discipline.
The third chapter focuses on corporate governance practices in the common law
and civil law jurisdictions and elaborates their salient differences. A further analysis of
these distinctions is undertaken in a study of the national governance systems of

24

Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of
Global Corporate Governance, 84 Cornell l. rev. 1133, 1134 (1999).

5

Germany, Japan, United States25 and the United Kingdom26 . These countries have been
selected because collectively they represent some of the distinct features found in both
legal jurisdictions. The impact of these different national systems on the investor and
multinational corporations will be discussed. In a similar fashion, the fourth chapter
discusses globalization vis-à-vis the corporate governance principles of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development and the theory of convergence. Scholarly
arguments in favor of and against globalization and its implications will be considered. A
brief conclusion ends the discussion in Chapter five.
The overall result of this thesis shall be an understanding of the international
corporate governance systems that currently exist, theories that have been formed and
how the systems affect investors and nations in this era of globalization.

25

Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary
Society: Corporate Governance at Crossroads, 62-sum law & contemp. probs.9, 51(1999).
Where is noted that together, the United States, Germany and Japan comprise three of the world’s
largest industrial economies in the world and at the end of 1994, 350 of the worlds 500 largest
non-financial companies were found in one of these three countries. Also their governance
systems have spread to other countries. In Europe countries like Austria, Belgium, and Hungary
and to a lesser extent France, Switzerland, much of northern Europe and newly liberalized
countries of Eastern Europe have evolved their system on Germanic lines. The influence of the
Japanese governance system is evident in Asia where it has been the largest direct foreign
investor in the last decade. Variants of the Anglo-American system found in the United States are
found in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Europe.
26
Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance, 34 cornell int’l l.J.321, 336 (2001). Where it is states that British company law and
institutions have influenced the Pacific Rim, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and India. In Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLE FEATURES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

A. What is Corporate Governance?
The absence of any real consensus of what corporate governance is means there is no
single definition of the term27 . One author in the early nineties described corporate
governance as a topic recently conceived, as yet ill defined and consequently blurred at
the edges28 . However this opinion does not stand in the present age given the plethora of
academic writing and research in this area. Over the years the subject has been written on
extensively from the standpoint of academics, legal practitioners, economists and the
like29 .
Academicians like Monks and Minow30 have defined corporate governance as the
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of
corporations. The primary participants being: the shareholders, the management (led by

27

Kevin Keasey et al., The Corporate Governance Problem - Competing Diagnosis and Solutions,
in Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Issues 2 (Kevin Keasey et al, eds., 1997).
28
Nigel G. Maw et al, Maw On Corporate Governance 1 (1994).
29
John W. Cioffi, State of the Art: A Review Essay on Comparative Corporate Governance: The
State of the Art and Emerging Research, 48 am. j. comp. l. 501 (2000).
30
Gregory V. Varallo and Daniel A. Dreisbach, Fundamentals of Corporate Governance; A
Guide for Directors and Corporate Counsel, 52 bus. law. 729 (1997), where Monk is described
as the one of the founding gurus of corporate governance.
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the chief executive officer), and the board of directors. Other participants include the
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and the community31 .
An internationally accepted definition used by the Organization for Economic
Development Cooperation reads:
“Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and
controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board,
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures
for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure
through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those
objectives and monitoring performance.”32

One common theme coming through is that corporate governance is ‘a matrix of legal
responsibilities’ among the different participants33 . This is because the right, obligations
and impact of the relationships amongst them play a role in determining the corporate
direction, strategy and performance34 . Corporate governance also calls for the study into
the intricacies of the relationships of the various parties of the corporation and the
relationship it shares with persons that own it, manage it and other stakeholders35 .
When we look back at the Berle and Means theory of the modern public
corporation, they demonstrated that the direction of the business corporation was no
longer in the hands of those who owned stock in them, the shareholders, but was in the
hands of those hired to operate the company, the managers and directors36 . This was
31

Robert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance 4 (1995).
Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (visited March 14 2002)
www.oecd.org/daf/governance/Q & As.htm.
33
Maw, supra note 28, at 3.
34
Monks, supra note 31, at 1.
35
Id.
36
Richard Ellis, foreword in BROWN, supra note 1, at xix.
32
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considered to be the inevitable feature of the public corporation at the time. It was not
until recently that the possibility of uniting ownership and control existed37 .
The advent of institutional investors changed the corporate scenario as
shareholding became more concentrated and the Berle and Means theory model of public
held corporations was no longer valid38 . The impact of the institutional investors will be
further discussed in the next chapter. Suffice to say, for the moment, that where
individual shareholders previously had no clout, this new breed of investors has the
power and influence to demand accountability from the corporations.

Today's

institutional investors have the largest concentration of investment dollars and the
sharpest growing rates39 . Unsatisfied shareholders no longer divest themselves of their
interests in companies but demand reform on a myriad of issues ranging from
environmental issues to social reform and even changes in corporate practice40 .

B. Corporate Constituents.
The law speaks of a corporation as a ‘legal person’ created separate from its owners and
having statutory rights and responsibilities41 . There are four main characteristics that are
essential to a

corporate form. These are; limited liability, legal personality. transferable

investor rights and centralized management42 . The concept of the corporation in countries
whose governance structures this paper will review; Germany, Japan, United Kingdom
37

Bainbridge, supra note 8 at 671, 672 (1995).
Id.
39
Carol B, Swanson, Corporate Governance: sliding Seamlessly into the 21st Century, 21 j. corp.
l. 417, 421 (1996).
40
James C. Worthy and Robert Neuschel, Emerging Issues in Corporate Governance 1 (1984).
41
Tricker, supra note 5, at 10.
38
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and United States, is basically the same. However the precise details and governance
mechanisms differ43 .
The most significant players in the corporate world are the shareholders, the board
of directors and the executive managers. Although for countries like Japan and Germany
it shall later be shown that banks and other investors that own indirect controlling
interests in the corporations occupy prominent positions in the governance systems44 .
The notion of accountability in governance shows that it is a two way street. Just
as the corporation is responsible towards its shareholders and other stakeholders,
governance practices determine how these shareholders and stakeholders monitor and
control the corporation45 .

Shareholders.
Shareholders are people who own a certificate representing entitlement to a proportional
share of the corporation46 . The fact that the shareholders are the owners of a corporation
goes to the root of corporate governance47 . This ownership confers certain rights and
obligations that are determined by law. Some of the more important rights the
shareholders have are; to vote, transfer their shares, to sue the directors or managers for
breach of duty, the right to certain information from the company and when the company
42

Monks, supra note 3, at 11.
Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Corporate Governance and Competition, in Theoretical and
Empirical Perspectives 23 (Xavier Vives eds., 2000).
44
Vives, supra note 10, at 3.
45
Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global Environment; The
Search for the Best of Both Worlds, 33 vand j. transnat’l l. 829, 833 (2000).
46
Monks, supra note 31, at 100.
47
Maw, supra note 28, at 1.
43
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is liquidated, to residual rights once the creditors are paid 48 . Shareholders influence the
corporation management by exercising their voting rights at the general meeting to elect
the board of directors49 . They may also use the proxy process to introduce shareholder
proposals 50 . In the United States they also have additional power to commence derivative
suits against the corporation to correct wrongs done to the corporation51 . Individual
shareholders may have little impact because of their minority shares, but the advent of
institutional shareholders, at least in the common law jurisdictions, has seen a greater
influence exerted on managers52 . However in many countries in the civil jurisdiction the
shareholders have less influence. For instance in Japan they virtually have none except to
supply capital53 .

The Board of Directors.
The Board of directors is a crucial part of the corporate structure54 . It is the link between
those involved in the day-to-day running of the corporation, the managers, and those who
own it, the shareholders55 . The board is concerned with a broader view and long term
strategic planning56 . It determines the corporate strategy, monitors the implementation

48

Id.
Maw, supra note 28, at 7.
50
Paul J. N. Halpern, Systematic Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems, in Corporate
Governance and Globalization 9 (Stephen S. Cohen and Gavin Boyd eds.,2000).
51
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2nd cir. 1982).
52
Vives, supra note 10, at 7.
53
Monks, supra note 31, at 268.
54
Id at 178.
55
Id
56
Brown, supra note 1, at 6.
49
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processes and supervises management 57 . It adds the element of checks and balances to the
corporate structure. The board members have a fiduciary duty to all their shareholders
and are accountable to them and to the corporation58 . There is no standard global practice
that maps out how the board ought to be composed or the methodology of how to achieve
its role59 . Each board determines its own procedures. However what remains constant is
that it lies at the center of all governance models.
Governance is concerned about the need for directors to stand for elections
regularly, to disclose their remuneration, the presence of non-executive directors and the
establishment of independent committees of the board. However in certain situations like
bankruptcy, the structure of corporate control is altered and does not rest with the board
of directors. In these instances corporate control may rest with a Trustee, Receiver or by
whatever name they may be called in different jurisdictions.

Executive Management.
The managers are the technocrats involved in the day to day running of the business.
Their

traditional

focus

is

on

planning,

organizing,

motivating,

controlling

and

coordinating60 . They are concerned with internal relationships and procedures. Corporate
governance is not concerned with this level of running the corporation per se, but with
giving it an overall direction that normally starts at the level of Executive Director. It is a

57

Mary E. Kissane, Global flies: Applications and Implementations of US Style Corporate
Governance Abroad, 17 n.y. l. sch. j. int’l & comp.L.621, 625 (1997).
58
Monks, supra note 4, at 182-184.
59
Kissane, supra note 57.
60
Tricker, supra note 5, at 6.
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function that is quite distinct from management. Governance is largely concerned with
the relationship of the corporation to the institutions and environment within which it
functions61 . It involves setting the corporate direction and is involved in executive action,
supervision and accountability62 .

Corporate Stakeholders.
These stakeholders include the employees, banks, auditors, regulators, creditors,
customers, suppliers and the community. Corporate stakeholders are generally free to
bargain their contracts and agreements with the company that, to a large degree, defines
the relationship of the stakeholders to the corporation.
For instance in the civil law jurisdiction of Germany and Japan, banks plays a huge role
in the corporate structure63 . Overall governance must take into account the existence of
duties and responsibilities that a corporation has, under general law, to all these bodies. It
makes managers internalize the welfare of these stakeholders in the firm64 .

C. Enforcement Mechanisms.
Corporate governance is enforced through a framework of laws, regulatory institutions
and reporting requirements that condition the way the corporate sector is managed65 . The
laws that govern the relationship of the corporate constituents to the corporation are

61

Worthy, supra note 40, at 4.
Tricker, supra note 5, at 10.
63
Vives, supra note 10, at 3.
64
Id at 1.
65
Halpern, supra note 50, at 6.
62
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defined by legislation and by the laws of the market place66 . Regarding the former, this
enforcement and regulation comes in the form of case law, legislation and corporate
practice67 . Simultaneously an enforcement role is played by corporate regulators such as
the Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission whose monitoring is
an important element in the area of disclosure68 . Corporate governance is also enforced
through checks and balances to maintain legitimacy and credibility in the system69 . This
is done mostly through independent non-executive directors and auditors.
Markets play an important role in the enforcement process. An efficient market
monitors managerial activities through the presence of information on the corporations.
But this only happens if the corporation operates in an efficient market70 .

D. Does Corporate Governance Matter?

Efficiency and Corporate Governance.
There has been skepticism about the benefits of corporate governance especially in the
light of so many other issues like competitors, financing and marketing which seem to

66

Monks, supra note 31, at 21.
Maw, supra note 28, at 4; Vives, supra note 10, at 3 .Where the article states that the quality of
legal protection provided by corporate governance is measured by (1) the exercise of the
shareholders right to elect the board and vote on matter like mergers (2) the enforcement of the
boards fiduciary duties (3) enforcement by creditors exercising their right to repossess assets or
collateral thereby altering the management structure through a reorganization and (4) the quality
of legal empowerment and the standards of accounting.
68
Id at 6.
69
Monks, supra note 31, at 23.
70
Halpern, supra note 50, at 6.
67
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have the investors’ priority71 . One of the issues that corporate governance is concerned
about is finding that delicate balance between the need to hold companies accountable
without making the requirements too burdensome that the economic efficiency of the
corporation is impaired72 .
A research in the United States asked Chief Executive Officers and other top
executives whether they were willing to pay more for the stock of a well-governed
corporation. They were asked to compare two well performing companies and state
whether they would pay more for the stock of one of these companies if it was well
governed.

The response was in the affirmative. As one Chief Executive Officer

explained,
“Good corporate governance is somewhat akin to the headlights of a car. If these two
companies are in a daytime race nothing goes wrong – then they are evenly matched. If
the race goes past dusk, however, the company with good governance has the headlights
to deal with the problem.”73 .
According to this research74 , over one hundred investors, chief executive officers and
senior executives said that good governance made a difference which investors were
willing to pay for. The study identified three types of investors who cared about good
governance. They could be separated into three groups; the investors with lower turnover
ratios who held shares longer and believed that good governance would improve the
companies performance in the long run, investors who pursued a ‘value strategy’ by

71

Robert Felton et al, Putting a Value on Board Governance, 170 the mckinsey quarterly (1996)
Swanson, supra note 39, at 417.
73
Felton, supra note 71, at 36.
74
Id .
72
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investing in under valued corporations with low price/earnings ratio in the hope that the
company would grow. They believed a good board would help improve under performing
stock and capture hidden value. The third group were investors who managed money for
high net worth individuals, endowments, foundations and public pensions.
The four main reasons these investors would pay a good premium for good
governance were; a belief that a company would perform well over time and this would
lead to higher returns, that it reduced the likelihood of bad things happening to the
company and even if they did happen, a well governed company would rebound more
easily. Finally some investors did so because the governance debate was a considered ‘a
fad’.
While this study did not show that corporate governance was a top priority,
because items like strategy, cash flow, and competitive position ranked higher, it
nonetheless showed that governance occupied a position somewhere on the priority list.
This led to the conclusion that believing in the value of corporate governance should no
longer be a question of good faith.
That said, however, the existence of a clear link between corporate governance
and corporate performance is not self-evident. It is a mere hypothesis75 . There have been
some empirical studies done that have been undertaken to establish this connection. Some
of these studies have established that regulatory and institutional structures influence the
development of stock markets76 . Another has shown that the mandatory disclosure of

75

Ronald Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency; When Do Institutions Matter?
74 wash. u. l. q. 327, 328 (1996).
76
William Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and
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reliable information is directly proportional to a firm’s ability to encourage investor
participation in the stock market77 . While a third study done to test national systems
against different indices like shareholder protection, ownership concentration and the
financial system showed a positive co-relation between the level of legal investor
protection on the one hand and the size of the market and prevalence of dispersed
shareholders on the other hand 78 .

The Role of Competition.
One argument raised about the relationship between corporate governance and efficiency
is the role of competition79 . It has been argued that competition is a powerful force for
ensuring good corporate governance. For instance, if managers of a firm are wasteful or
consume large amounts of resources, the firm will be unable to compete favorably and
will go bankrupt.80
That the role of competition in providing information and an environment for comparison
acts as a catalyst for efficiency81 . It forces the board and management to be disciplined.

Comparative Corporations Governance, 2 theoretical inquiries 745, 751 (2001)
77
Id.
78
Id at 751.
79
Allen, supra note 43, at 56.
80
Id.
81
Id.

17

CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS

A. Distinguishing Corporate Governance in Common law and
Civil Law Jurisdictions.
The evolution of corporate governance has taken place world wide at different paces and
systems differ even amongst the worlds advanced market economies82 . Systems have
evolved differently mainly due to varied historical, political, social and economic
backgrounds83 . But perhaps the most important influence could be attributed to the legal
jurisdictions that have shaped the way corporations are governed in different countries84 .
Legal jurisdictions are broadly divided into two groups; civil law and common law. The
starting point of the governance debate in either jurisdiction is not the same85 . The civil
law jurisdiction, also known as Romano Germanic, is predominantly found in continental
Europe and other countries influenced by that part of Europe. It utilizes statutes and
comprehensive codes as the primary means of organizing its legal principles86 .
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characterized by Judge made laws and the use of precedents87 . However its important to
note that even though common law countries share a common history in their legal
system, to a large extent their internal judicial systems have subsequently had
independent developments. These countries, albeit being part of the same legal system,
have differences amongst themselves88 . However, comparative legal scholars generally
agree that countries following common law share more critical features with each other
than with members of other legal groups. In the civil law system, countries have
developed more independently and diverged from each other more than countries under
common law89 .
Corporate governance in the common law system is market oriented90 . It is also
referred to as the shareholder-market model or the stock market-centered capital model91 .
It is characterized by a liquid stock market and dispersed ownership of public
corporations 92 . Shareholders own the corporation’s equity and it fluctuates depending on
how well the company is doing93 . The investing public are the direct risk takers94 . Banks
act as a source of extra funds but generally play a limited role95 . The possibilities of
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takeovers, proxy fights and boardroom coups are not foreign concepts to this model96 . In
contrast, the civil system is referred to as the bank/labor model97 or the bank-centered
capital model98 . It is characterized by concentrated family control of large businesses99 .
Capital for both debt and equity financing is supplied by banks100 . These banks enter into
long term and stable relationships with the corporations101 . They also own large amounts
of stock in these companies102 . There is no active liquid capital market because of the
presence of concentrated ownership and bank debt holdings 103 . This means that the
jurisdiction requires fewer regulatory mechanisms as compared with the market model
that requires a complex system of checks and balances104 .
In the market model, shareholders are the owners of the corporation. But
management rests in the hands of the directors105 . The relationship of the employees,
suppliers, creditors and customers to the corporation is set by contracts. In the bank/labor
model, the board and managers operate the firm in the interest of all the stakeholders and
not just the shareholders106 .
These differences have been conceptualized in a theory that refers to the market
model as contractualism and the bank-labor model as communitarian107 . Shareholders lie
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at the center of the contractualism model and the corporations primary concern is to
them108 . The corporation is viewed as a myriad of contracts, which together with market
forces act to regulate the relationship between the shareholders and the managers109 . In
the communitarian school of thought, the corporation has a social responsibility to all
stakeholders110 .
The existence of these diverse practices has ignited a debate over which system of
corporate governance is better111 . Theory has emerged that the ‘competition’ between the
shareholder market model and bank/labor model systems of governance will lead them to
converge and form a single efficient system112 . Interestingly some scholars have argued
that the convergence will result in a worldwide replication of the American system by
larger corporations 113 . That this convergence would either be functional convergence or
formal114 . The idea of such convergence has been heavily criticized as presumptuous and
impractical115 .
contractarian approach and those holding communitarian ideals. The differences mirror the
characteristics of the market model and the bank/labor models of corporate governance
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While subsequent discussion will show that countries are now increasingly
changing practices to attract foreign investment, the fact is they have still retained
features that make them distinct. The next section explores the salient features of
corporate governance practices in selected countries, which collectively represent the
civil and common law legal jurisdictions.

B. National Corporate Governance Systems.
The review of these systems will be limited to; the board of directors, shareholder
participation, stakeholders and major factors that have influenced the systems. This
analysis is based on past research conducted in this field.

Germany.
The distinct feature of Germanys company law is the two-tier board of directors system
that is a legal requirement for all stock companies employing five hundred or more
employees116 . This legal system has a unique management structure that comprises two
boards of directors; the management board with executive responsibilities, vorstand and
the supervisory board with control functions, Aufsichtsrat 117 . The former board is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the business while the latter is concerned
with the supervision118 . The two boards are so distinct in character and composition that
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members of one board cannot sit on the other119 . The supervisory board, management
boards and shareholders are the three legal organs that meet at the annual general
meeting120 . The other two features that stand out in Germany are the voting strengths of
the banks and the power of the labor force121 .
The origin of the board system in Germany dates back to the beginning of
German Corporation law and reform in the nineteenth century122 . The supervisory board,
the Aufsichtsrat, was formed to substitute the state charter and previously existing
continuous state controls were abolished123 . Its duty is to supervise management and
attend to the long term strategic planning of the corporation124 . Its power over
management extends to making appointments, dismissals and fixing remuneration for the
management board125 . While it does not make management decisions, ti approves certain
actions contemplated126 . The supervisory board is composed of shareholders, the
workforce and trade union representatives. They are appointed, respectively, by the
shareholders, the workers of the corporation and the trade union127 . Their ratio on the
boards is determined by general law that requires that in companies with a work force of
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less than 2000 employees, one third of the supervising board shall be elected by the
employees. In larger corporations, the ratio of employees would be half128 .
The management board represents the company in third party dealings and
submits regular report to the supervisory board129 . The members are appointed for fiveyear terms by the supervisory board and may be dismissed for compelling reasons 130 .
Critics however fear that the close interaction of these boards may affect objective
supervision131 .
In a country known for its extensive banking network, banks play a prominent
role in the governance of corporate entities. They are in a position to exercise this
influence by virtue of their significant holding in the majority of German companies and
through their representation on the supervisory boards of about two thirds of Germanys
listed companies132 . Even though the banks representation on company boards has greatly
reduced, the influence of German banks is much wider in context than their mere
presence on the supervisory board133 . Their real influence comes from the combination of
the supervisory board seats, stock participation, bank proxy votes and the banks credit
and underwriting business134 . In addition, although wealthy individuals and families as
well as non-financial firms tend to be large stockholders, the individual investors will
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normally give the banks proxy-voting authority to administer these shares on their
behalf135 .
The employees’ presence on the supervisory board can be traced to the end of the
First World War136 . This practice of worker participation on the board commonly referred
to as co-determination was further ingrained in 1976 when the current legal framework in
Germany was established137 . Co-determination refers to the dual-board structure peculiar
to Germany and is modeled on a theory that because labor and capital co-determine a
corporation’s future, both should be represented on the supervisory board138 . The role
played by the employees is a question of debate. But their presence has definitely been
consolidated by the fact that two-thirds of the employees pension contributions are
retained within the corporation and this represents a source of internal revenue to the
corporations 139 .
The result of the corporate structure means that the board represents a wide range
of interests beyond just the shareholder140 . Less emphasis is placed on dividends, as
compared to the United Kingdom and the United States. More emphasis is placed on the
long-term viability of the company141 .

Shareholders are concerned more with the
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companies’ strategic plans than with dividends142 . Perhaps owing to this reduced status,
the shareholder meeting in Germany has been compared to communist party conventions
where people are not encouraged to dissent 143 .

Japan.
The Japanese corporate governance system is best understood from a historical
perspective following the Second World War. The shortage of capital pushed banks into
prominence because they played the dual role of holding shares in corporations and
simultaneously providing capital, which, amongst other things, allowed corporations to
invest in shares of other companies144 . Resulting from this history, banks play a key role
in corporate governance.
Japanese company law is codified in the Japanese Commercial Law145 . It has its
origins form the late nineteenth century Germany and though it resembles the German
system in some ways, it differs in many respects146 . One thing it did not import was the
German dual board system because following American occupation, after the Second
World War, it imported many United States rules which included the American style
board of directors147 . The Japanese board is a management board that is comprised almost
entirely of full time employees or former employees148 . It is described as ‘homogenous’
142
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because it is generally composed of; about twenty-five men, at least 50 years old and
most of whom are former employees149 . Corporations must have at least three directors
elected by shareholders to serve fixed terms not exceeding two years. The directors are
bound by fiduciary duties to the shareholders that elected them150 . However shareholders
rarely seek the enforcement of fiduciary duties151 . The presence of outside directors is a
rare phenomenon152 .
Another significant feature is the large companies whose stock is held by
‘concentrated shareholders‘153 . Stable shareholders that include other corporations, major
creditors, major customers or suppliers hold the majority of these shares154 . This
shareholding is done on reciprocal basis and has resulted in a dense network of mutual
shareholding155 . This network, known as keiretsu, refers to a group of corporations in
which the individual firms each own some stock of the other member firms156 . Apart
from corporations, banks and insurers also own large stock in the keiretsu firms equal to
about 5% each thus creating a voting block of over 20% of the keiretsu stock157 . A clear
pattern emerges where the majority of shareholders in Japan are corporations that are
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both shareholders and stakeholders in the corporation158 . The role played by individual
shareholders is minimal159 .
The keiretsu’s monitor the firms that it has an interest in. They conduct much of
this monitoring at monthly meetings of the keiretsu president’s council160 . This is
essentially a ‘second board’ on which the presidents of the keiretsu member boards sit.
Though the council does not vote, members of the companies’ boards will not act
contrary to the council’s opinion. They will also consult the council when one of the
keiretsu firms is about to make a major decision161 .
The banks are involved in monitoring and will usually choose one bank from
amongst them to conduct this monitoring162 . They are generally forceful and will
intervene when a company goes into financial problems by sending in their own set of
directors. Together, the keiretsu and the banks exercise tremendous power over
managers163 . The government also plays a major role in regulating businesses164 .

United Kingdom.
The formal system of corporate governance in the United Kingdom is a very traditional
one165 . Very little of the corporate model has changed from that which was devised by
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parliament in the middle of the nineteenth century166 . The control of the company is
determined by its share structure167 . The opinions of the majority shareholders rule. With
the decrease of individual equity ownership168 and an increase of institutional
shareholding, this majority ownership is increasingly lying in the hands of institutional
shareholders169 . Even though historically these institutional investors have traditionally
influenced management behind closed doors, they are now more visible in their
confrontations170 . The value of their equity holding has made them the most important
single group holding securities171 . The main reason for their growth stems from the
expansion of pension funds available for investment as a result of increased private
retirement savings and a growth of insurance companies172 . However unlike in the United
States where similar change precipitated corporate governance, in the United Kingdom
institutional investors were not active but reactive in taking an active role in the
development of corporate governance173 .
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Shareholders are central to the corporation and they exercise corporate suffrage
by voting for the board174 . There is no worker representation on the board and though
this idea was floated in the 1970’s, it did not take effect175 . The board’s main duty is to
overlook the affairs of the company and ensure management performs efficiently176 . It is
typically composed of senior full time executives and non-executives or outside
directors177 . All directors owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders and are collectively
responsible for the decisions taken by the board178 .
The British governance system differs from continental European systems179 . It
resembles the United States in many ways with some salient differences180 . Both
countries have adopted a shareholder model181 . Very few large corporations are
controlled by dominant owners and the majority of shareholders are dispersed182 . These
management executives have typically run the corporation183 . But unlike the United
States, Britain has a non-executive chairman on the majority of its boards and a majority
of inside directors184 . The governance debate in this jurisdiction has mainly been on the
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role of non-executive directors and institutional shareholders in monitoring executive
performance185 .
The corporate governance debate in the United Kingdom reached a climax in
1991 when the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the
accountancy profession set up the Cadbury Committee to examine the financial aspects of
corporate governance. This became necessary following concerns of an apparent lack of
confidence in financial reporting and in the effective supervision of management by
company boards186 . The reasons for this negativity were well summed by the Cadbury
committee chairman Sir Adrian Cadbury who said that;

"The harsh economic climate is partly responsible, since it has exposed company reports
and accounts to unusually close scrutiny. It is, however, the continuing concern about
standards of financial reporting and accountability, heightened by Bank of Credit and
Commerce, Maxwell and the controversy over directors' pay, which has kept corporate
governance in the public eye"187 .

The Cadbury committee had the task of codifying the responsibilities of executive and
non-executive directors, audit committees, auditors and linking the responsibilities of the
board, shareholders and auditors188 . The work resulted in the Cadbury Code of Best
Practice. It had a wide range of recommendations 189 . Though many of its guidelines were
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not applied in the United Kingdom, the report is credited with improving corporate
standards in companies190 .
Subsequent to the Cadbury committee, two other committees were set up in 1995.
The Greensburg committee and the Hampel committee. Both were named after their
respective chairmen. The first committee was convened to explore the issue of directors’
remuneration191 . This committee recommended the composition of remuneration subcommittees composed of non-directors and it also called for increased shareholder
participation and transparency192 . Many of its recommendations were incorporated in the
stock exchange listing rules193 .
The Hampel Committee studied the recommendations of the two previous
committees and explored how they could be achieved. Its focus was on three areas;
disclosure of executive pay, the role the executive and non-executive directors and the
participation of institutional investors194 . It concluded its work in 1998195 . Its final report
culminated in the ‘Combined Code’ which was attached to the listing rules of the London
Stock Exchange, also referred to as the ‘Yellow Book’. Listed companies are expected to
observe these rules in this yellow book196 .
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United States of America.
Focusing on the last three decades in the United States, the corporate governance debate
and its development was catalyzed by certain key events. Firstly while for many years
publicly traded corporations raised capital by selling shares to the public, managers still
retained corporate control over the companies. This was largely because the shareholder
base was composed of several unconnected individuals who did not have the ability to
influence management197 . Individually, shareholders had little clout to influence any
changes198 . Hence the ‘wall street rule’ was the route to take. Translated, it meant that if
shareholders did not agree with the way management conducted the business, they were
free to sell their shares and walk away199 .
An increase in the financial wealth of United States households was directly
proportional to an increase of pensions and mutual funds because a number of families
chose to invest in them200 . Furthermore the enactment of legislation in the United States
permitting pension funds and trusts to invest in equities was an added attraction that saw
the growth of institutional investors in the capital market201 . The increase of these
institutional investors took place over the last three decades202 . This resulted in a
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significant change in the ownership of public corporations. Similar to the United
Kingdom, institutional investors represented the largest number of individual investors.
As a result they not only held significant blocks of shares, they had the power of attorney
to act as though they were the equity holders. Because they managed large blocks of
equity, it became impractical for unsatisfied institutional investors to divest themselves of
their interests and exercise the ‘wall street rule’ as this would impact negatively on the
value of their shares. Instead they chose to maintain their equity holding but begun
pressing for changes and exploring for ways to exercise their influence in corporations
failing to live up to their expectations. One way was by demanding their representation
on the boards. By the 1970’s and 1980’s most corporations added outside directors to
their boards so that most boards now consisted of at least a majority of outside
directors203 .
One of the institutional investors who rejected the ‘wall street rule’ and believed
that the most responsible and successful investor approach was to present shareholder
concerns directly to management and encourage it to make changes was the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA-CREF)204 .

In 1993, it released a detailed list

of its corporate governance policies that it intended to pursue on all its portfolio
companies205 . Its statement focused on a need for boards of directors to have a majority
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of outside directors, compensation and adequate disclosure206 . Other institutional
investors like the California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS) joined in
the 'institutional activism’ and public companies were forced to hear their voices207 .
Other reasons that precipitated corporate governance was the 1980’s period that
was characterized by takeovers, leveraged buyouts and junk bonds208 . Corporations
responded to these threats by adopting charters and by-laws that included poison pills,
classified boards et al. This created tension amongst institutional investors who felt the
boards and management tried to entrench themselves and frustrate the shareholders desire
to get an immediate premium on their shares209 . The investors again recognized that their
influence on the board would only be possible if they were represented.
By 1982 the Corporate Governance Project of the American Law Institute (ALI)
had begun to work on its first, albeit controversial, draft of the principles on Corporate
Governance. This was probably the first documented attempt to articulate this topic and
give it boundaries and substance210 . The institute examined corporate governance widely
and produced the principles in 1994. However, the importance of the project was
overshadowed by controversy and difficulties resulting from the plethora of corporation
law that existed211 . The principles addressed issues concerned with the objective and the
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conduct of business, corporate structure, management fiduciary obligations and remedies.
The results of this project were unsatisfactory to many and most agree that the principles
will have little effect212 .
One unique feature in the American legal system is federalism. Its significance on
corporate governance is that persons wishing to incorporate a company have a choice of
State corporation law213 . Irrespective of where that corporation selects to operate from,
under the principle known as internal affairs, the laws that shape its corporate governance
structure will be determined by the incorporating state with occasional exception214 .
Traditionally states have the power to regulate the relationship between corporations,
management and shareholders through legislation and judicial rulings215 . It has even been
suggested that states are in a race to the bottom to attract companies to incorporate by
lowering the standard of shareholder protection216 . Whatever the case, corporate
governance cannot be understood only by reference to state law217 . Though the federal
government has not created comprehensive federal corporation laws, technically it
could218 . However, even in the absence of such federal laws, many federal statutes affect
various aspects of corporate governance and these laws have to be taken into account 219 .
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While the intricacies of the substantive corporate governance systems differ from
state to state, and corporation to corporation, corporate governance principles in the
United States can be described in terms of generally favored practices220 . Shareholders
occupy a prominent place as the residual owners of the company221 . They lie at the center
of the governance system. Most public corporations have boards of directors that are
composed of a majority outside directors. These directors are mostly drawn from ranks of
current or retired chief executive officers of other corporations. Its also not uncommon to
find university resident academicians and scientists appointed board members to
corporations whose line of business they share at an academic level222 . The boards
oversee the management of corporations. The directors and management owe the
corporation and its shareholders fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. They are bound by
these standards and there is a mechanism to enforce them223 . Under common law, courts
have endorsed the business judgment doctrine, which creates an assumption that the
board makes a decision that is reasonable, and safe 224 . If the board breaches the business
judgment rule, shareholders may commence derivative actions against the defaulting
board on their own behalf and that of the corporations, Companies also have audit
governance of corporations generally, numerous statutes affect the governance of corporations
generally. Some examples are the National Bank Act (relating to election of directors and
composition of the board), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (structural requirements relating
to shareholders), The Public Utility Holding Company Act (capital structure, proxy solicitation,
accounting practices and intra state company transactions), the Internal Revenue Code (employee
stock ownership plans) and ERISA (impacts on governance of pension plans).
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committees, which liaise with the corporation’s external auditors. These committees are
usually composed of outside directors225 .
The Securities and Exchange Commission is a key agency whose rule making
authority affects a corporation’s governance226 . One significant way it has achieved this
is by requiring corporations to set up special committees to the board. The most
significant being the audit committee227 . The audit rules set out the qualifications for
directors who serve on the committee and define how the outside committees will relate
to the audit committee228 . The various Stock Exchange’ also adopt rules in their manuals
that govern listing companies by requiring them to comply with their rules which affect
governance. The most notable exchanges are the New York Stock Exchange and the
American Stock Exchange.

C. International Investors in a Corporate Governance Maze.
Advances in telecommunications and the convenience of international travel coupled
with expanding stock exchanges and pension funds have collectively increased
globalization and demanded that those who control large companies have to be aware of
governance systems beyond their own229 . There are a growing number of companies that
seek to raise capital abroad and a corresponding large fraction of investors who are
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investing funds outside their home countries230 . For instance, a French corporation may
seek to issue securities in Great Britain that residents in the United States or Canada may
purchase. Thereafter an initial purchaser may in turn resale the French issuer’s securities
to other investors in other countries located on different continents231 .
These investors look to corporate governance standards to protect their funds232 .
For these reasons international investors acting as issuer or purchaser, perhaps more than
ever, need to understand the structure of different corporate governance regimes in
various countries233 . As yet, there is no single corporate governance practice. When it
comes to regulating cross border security transaction, countries apply their laws only to
transactions that have connection with their territorial jurisdiction234 . But two schools of
thought have been advanced on this matter. The first is that a corporation’s home country
should regulate all transactions regardless of the location of the transaction, while the
second school of thought calls for the harmonization of different securities regimes235 .
The desire to diversify their portfolios has caused institutional investors,
particularly in America, to increasingly make significant investments abroad236 . Although
on unfamiliar territories, these investors continue to use shareholder activism to minimize
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their risk and costs of investing abroad237 . The presence of these foreign investors has had
an impact on various national systems. For instance, United States institutional investors
have urged European companies to make significant changes to their formal governance
institutions to resemble United States style institutions238 . Countries like the United
Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan have had to make changes239 . In Germany
particularly, excessive influence by the banks has emerged as a key structural problem as
the German capital markets compete for global investment240 . Federal legislation to
reduce shareholding has been introduced by the ruling party241 . Japan is also moving
toward a share holder-market model242 .
Public corporations have also bent backwards in order to attract capital. DaimlerBenz was willing to change its accounting and disclosure practices in order to be eligible
to list its securities on the New York Stock Exchange 243 . Conversely the rejection of
Rupert Murdoch’s proposed listing by the Australian stock exchange because he wanted
to sell non-voting stock demonstrated how crucial governance considerations are244 . All
these participants face scrutiny by investors, regulators, the media and the general public
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as they develop and refine standards of corporate governance that will allow them
compete for the attention of investors245 .
Securities Exchanges worldwide have responded to cross border investments with
many exchanges forming partnerships with one another that cut across international
boundaries. Frankfurt and London stock exchanges announced a plan to integrate their
facilities and permit trading of each other’s listed securities on both exchanges246 . Other
Exchanges in France, Italy and Spain also expressed their wish to enter into mergers247 .
In the global financial market, practices are being transformed to respond to the
investor’s search for international capital. Hence while core national governance systems
remain diverse, certain spheres, particularly in the area of accounting and disclosure have
become more global and more responsive to the current era. Under a project commenced
by the International Organization of Securities Commissions International (IOSCO)
international investors can use international disclosure standards that facilitate cross
border equity activities without compromising the amount or equality of information they
receive248 . Similarly, International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) gives
foreign corporations the option to prepare financial statements for foreign listings by
using IASC standards249 .
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While the globalization of finance is growing stronger with respect to investment,
barriers continue to exist with regard to banking services presumably because they are
strategically tied to a nations economy resulting in their protection from outside
competition250 . The result of the standardized finance options allow investor’s access to
information that will enable them compare the benefits of investing in companies
throughout the world251 . It also allows them to compare corporate performance at a global
level.

D. Multinational Corporations and Governance.
A multinational corporation is an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment and
owns or controls value-adding activities in more than one country252 . This can be
distinguished from international trading firms and domestic firms because it engages both
in cross-border production and transactions253 . The growth of huge multinational
corporations is touted as one of the most striking worldwide economic developments of
the late 1990’s and early 21st century254 . They are vehicles for the movement of capital,
goods and services in the global economy255 . Predictions are that by 2010, the number of
multinationals will be several times the number that existed a few years ago256 . The
driving force behind this is a quest to be one of the largest corporations in a given field on
250
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a global scale257 . In 1999, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) World Investment Report estimated that the total number of parent
corporations worldwide was almost 60,000 with half a million foreign associates258 .
Several issues surround multinational corporations but the scope of this paper
extends its interest only to the implications of international corporate governance
practices on multinational corporations and vice versa. A multinational company’s choice
of domicile involves choosing amongst different governance structures. The corporate
governance challenge presented in well-developed governance systems is which domicile
the corporation shall choose to operate in. That decision can affect its competitiveness in
the open market and if it did, the corporation would choose to relocate elsewhere259 .
Conversely, multinational corporations may also take advantage of weak
governance systems in developing nations260 When they do, the corporate governance
challenge existing in this scenario changes. In the absence of strong enforcement
mechanisms, multinationals have been accused of violating labor, human rights and
environmental rights261 . An increased interest by non-governmental organizations and the
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press in the activities of multinational corporations has served to highlight these
factors262 . They have successfully acted as watchdogs of the system.
The negative activities publicized are inconsistent with the mandate of directors
who are expected to act in the best interest of the shareholders and corporation as a
whole263 . The result of such activities may reduce the corporations profitability through
cost of litigation or fines imposed on the defaulting corporation. For economic and moral
reasons, most institutional investors are committed to investing in socially responsible
enterprises, as they believe that they maximize shareholders returns264 . The notion of
‘ethical investment’ exists worldwide265 . Investors want to be sure that the corporations
they invest in are socially responsible. This responsibility is acknowledged by large
multinationals. For instance in the Unites States, the Organization of Business for Social
Responsibility was founded in 1992 to emphasize social responsibility. The organization
boasts of a membership of fourteen hundred corporations including Coco-cola, Federal
Express, Motorola and many other multinationals. Countries like Australia have passed
laws that impose minimum standards of conduct by Australian companies of a defined
size operating in foreign countries.
Multinational corporations need to use best practices principles when setting up
shop in jurisdictions that have weak governance practices or enforcement measures. For
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reasons already discussed in this chapter, this is a subject that must occupy high priority
on their agenda.
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CHAPTER 4
GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

A. Impact of Globalization on the Corporate Governance Debate.
Global processes are changes whose effects are felt and experienced beyond the borders
of a single locality. They may result from economic or political forces that create markets
for goods and services beyond the control of any one nation266 . These ‘global forces’
encourage new forms of economic and legal integration across different countries and
continents267 .
The globalization of corporate governance systems is part of the general
globalization of markets that has world financial regulators concerned268 . The debate in
this arena has been manifested at two different levels, one as a theory on convergence and
the second as the effort by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) to create global principles of corporate governance. The former is a theory
premised on contemporary governance debate that the prospect of international
convergence of corporate governance systems is imminent269 . Until recently, the
governance debate had focused on the merits of different national systems and the extent
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to which they positively promote corporations and the regional and national economies in
which they exist270 . Now the focus has shifted to a view that these different corporate
governance systems are achieving a high degree of uniformity and are likely to converge
into a single standard model271 .
A study of the implications of international governance practices would not be
complete without considering both these factors. This chapter highlights the OECD
principles and considers the theory of convergence of corporate governance systems.
These factors are considered in the light of their implications on investment.

B. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
The closest attempt, to date, at formulating global rules of corporate governance have
been the basic principles of corporate governance formulated by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development in 1999272 . This was the first time that a fullscale international report was produced to provide guidance to both public and private
policy makers on corporate governance273 .
The OECD is a predecessor to the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) that was created with a membership of eighteen countries in April
1948 shortly after the World War Two. Its main offices were in Paris. The OEEC was
established to oversee the Marshall plan aid to Europe and had the following aims; to
promote cooperation and commerce in Europe’s reconstructed economies, to develop a
270
271
272
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Europeans customs union and a free trade area

274

. The OEEC directed its energy towards

developing Europe’s economy and helped lay the foundation for the European Economic
Community (EEC). Once the EEC begun to function in 1977, the aims of the OEEC
became redundant and the members decided to create a new organization in its place, the
OECD275 . Its original membership of 21 countries has now expanded to 30 countries. The
members include the founding Western Europe members, the United States, Canada and
key NATO allies, Iceland and Turkey.
The OECDs’ main duty is to provide management consulting to member
governments. It researches and produces policies on a myriad of topics ranging from
trade matters to environmental issues. It also has the power to make recommendations,
which are non-binding agreements and to make decisions, which are legally binding on
the members.
In 1998, the OECD Council meeting at ministerial level asked the OECD in
conjunction with interested bodies to develop a set of corporate governance standards and
guidelines276 . This was prompted in part, by concerns that weaknesses in the corporate
governance system of some Asian countries led to the Asian crisis277 . In response to this,
an Ad-hoc task force was established to develop the final set of principles278 . The
negotiations took over a year and included the participation of key players279 . The
273
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principles were taunted as the chief response by Governments to the G-7 summit leader
recognition of corporate governance as an important pillar of the 20th century global
economy280 . On May 26-27 1999, ministers representing 29 member countries voted the
principles unanimously. In 2000, the OECD principles of corporate governance became
one of the 12 core standards of global financial stability and are now used as a benchmark
by international financial institutions281 .
The idea behind the principles is to assist governments in their effort to evaluate
and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in
their countries

282

. Other powerful financial bodies like the International Monetary Fund

and the World Bank have jumped on the bandwagon by placing governance on their
agendas. They have adopted the OECD principles as a guiding standard and have
included them as a pre requisite in their programs for aid to developing countries 283 .

C. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
The principles are divided into five parts284 . Each one dealing with aspects of corporate
governance that the OECD has deemed to be necessary for good governance and has
provided practical guidance. The standards provided are the minimum standards that
countries have an obligation to meet. Additional rights may be provided in varied
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jurisdictions. The areas outlined are; the rights of shareholders, the equitable treatment of
shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and the responsibilities of the board.

The Rights of Shareholders.
The OECD is concerned with the need to uphold the shareholders right to exercise
corporate suffrage and their ability to do so from an informed position made possible by
their access to accurate and timely information. Voting by proxy is encouraged and is
given as equal importance as votes cast in person.
The shareholders ability to influence certain fundamental changes in the
corporation like the election of the board, amendment of key documents and major
changes to the corporations core business is protected.

Other important shareholder

rights include the rights to dividends, to divest themselves of their shares and the right to
know of any corporate changes that will affect the corporate assets and the exercise of
their voting power. The principles are also mindful of the rights by shareholders, within
limit, to contribute to the agenda of the general meeting.

The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders.
Any divergence from the ’one share one vote’ standard is frowned upon. Emphasis is
placed on the need to give equal rights and treatment to shareholders holding shares in
the same class. This ensures the protection of minority and foreign shareholders. They
must be informed of the voting rights attached to the shares before purchase.
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The voting system should not be made too difficult or expensive such as to deny
any shareholder the right to vote.

It is also expected that nominees should vote in a

manner agreed upon with the beneficial owners of the shares. As part of the equitable
treatment accorded to shareholders, the principles prohibit insider trading and selfdealing by the corporation.

The Role of Stakeholders.
The OECD takes into account the interest of stakeholders like investors, employees,
creditors and suppliers. It recognizes that the success of any corporation is dependent on
teamwork and the resources that different stakeholders bring to the company.
Though stakeholder rights are established and may be enforced by general law,
the corporation has a responsibility to recognize the interests of these third parties and
their role played in achieving the corporation’s aspirations. Stakeholders are entitled, in
the event of a falling out, to transparent and clearly outlined channels of redress. They
should also have access to information in order to fulfill their obligations. The
governance

framework

encourages

the

enhancement

of

stakeholder

participation.

Particularly for employees through their representation on boards and stock ownership
plans.

Disclosure.
A high value is placed on the presence of strong disclosure practices. Disclosure has long
been recognized as a tool that coerces a corporation to act in the interest of its
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shareholders. Therefore the existence of a positive culture of disclosure attracts
investment and maintains confidence in the system. However this disclosure must
provide accurate, adequate and timely material information whose quality should be of
highest standards of accounting.
The OECD provides a non-exclusive list of items that must be disclosed. This
includes the financial status of the company, its objectives, major share ownership, voting
rights, information on members of the board and key executive, their remuneration and
any foreseeable material risk factors or issues affecting the stakeholders that the investors
should be privy to. Other information to be disclosed includes policies relating to
business ethics, the environment and other matters of public policy. It’s important for
stakeholders to relate the corporation to the society within which it operates.
The corporation should have annual audited accounts and statements prepared by
external auditors using high standards of accounting practices. These reports should be
accessible to the shareholders. The company should disclose this information using the
Internet or other technological means required in that jurisdiction. Annual reports and
audited accounts should be accessible. Board audit committees are encouraged as they
limit the risk of conflicts of interest.

The Responsibilities of the Board.
The OECD recognizes that even though board structures may vary, their basic duties
remain constant. A key responsibility is to monitor management’s activities and ensure
good returns for the shareholders while simultaneously ensuring that the corporation is
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conducting its activities within the general framework of the existing laws. The Boards
functions

also

include

strategic

planning

and

maintaining

the

integrity

of

the

corporation’s accounts and finances.
The existence of independent committees like the remuneration, audit and
nomination

committees

composed

of

non-executive

board

members

is

strongly

encouraged. This strengthens the boards transparency and effectiveness. The standard of
care required of the Board is that they act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with
due diligence and care in the best interest of the company.

D. Implications of the Principles.
The OECD principles have on the one hand been welcomed as a remarkable convergence
on corporate governance common ground among diverse interests, practices and
cultures285 . They have gained influence as they have been embraced by leading financial
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which are
traditional lending institutions to private sector development in emerging and developing
nations. The significance of this is two fold. Firstly, these principles have universal
application because both members of the OECD and non-member nations that want to
have access to investment opportunities and financing must observe the minimum
standards provided
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. Secondly the principles are not only confined to publicly listed

corporations, but extend to unlisted private companies and state owned enterprises in so
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far as either may wish to tap into the international capital market. This is true particularly
in countries that do not have well-developed liquid capital market and generally look to
local banks or International Finance Companies for capital. This fact was acknowledged
at the first Pan-African consultative forum on corporate governance held in Africa in
2001287 .
Though the principles appear somewhat harmless, as they are non-binding and
only for guidance purposes, the two significant factors mentioned show that they are less
harmless and may begin the imposition of a foreign corporate culture on several Asian,
African, South American and continental European States288 . These countries, who wish
to attract foreign aid in the form of loans, grants or under schemes of project financing
are required to impress donors with the OECD driven standard of corporate governance
in order to be considered as candidates for financial assistance. It is possible that noncompliance by countries will lead to ostracism and the threat of retaliation measures that
can harm the profitability of a countries enterprise289 .

E. Criticism of the Principles.
The main argument against the OECD principle is that the ‘one size fits all’ concept of
corporate governance means that issuers on different continents are being forced to
comply with rules imposed by institutional investors in London or New York in order to
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tap into the international capital market290 . Because the principles have an Anglo-Saxon
orientation, their impact on developed countries in the Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction will not
be significant291 . The same cannot be said of less developed nations and those falling
outside this jurisdiction. These principles ignore the need to understand corporate
governance systems in particular reference to their differences292 . Particularly that a
nations cultural values affects the development of its laws in general and its governance
system in particular293 . That is why the concept of a company and whose interest it serves
varies. For instance while in the United States a corporation is primarily run in the
interest of shareholders, in Germany and Japan it is considered irresponsible to run the
company exclusively for the interest of shareholders. Other stakeholders and society in
general have to be considered294 .
Suggestions have been made that the best way to formulate minimum standards of
global corporate governance is not by imposing this singular view of corporate
governance on the world. But rather to ‘regionalize’ it. This means formulating regional
corporate governance principles for both equity based or bank based jurisdictions 295 .
Another option would be to determine zones of influence and formulate principles for
each zone. This would result in the presence of multiple principles for the main legal
290
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jurisdictions and perhaps another set formulated for regions falling outside these
jurisdictions296 .

F. The Theory of Convergence.
The theory of convergence was postulated by comparative legal scholars who viewed
national governance systems to be in competition. They predicted that this competition
would cause the systems to converge into a single efficient system297 . This view has been
consistently held save for a change in the desirable system that the convergence will
replicate. For a while, the Japanese system seemed the favored one until the Japanese
‘bubble economy’ burst298 . Currently the American system is the favored one and it is the
theory of some American scholars that other countries are in the process of converging to
the American system299 . The debate also includes how this convergence will take place.
Whether it will be formal, where legislative action alters the basic structure of existing
corporate governance structures or functional, where the existing structures respond to
demands of change without altering their formal characteristics. There is no consensus on
which mode the convergence will adopt300 . But pressure will also come from the global
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integration of financial markets. Advocates predict that this convergence will lead to
more efficient allocation of capital and improve access to investment opportunities and
financing301 .

G. Critics of the Convergence Theory of Corporate Governance Systems.
This theory of convergence has been met with dissenting opinions. Criticism has been
leveled against scholars who are predicting the convergence of governance systems in
general. One criticism is that it is a mistake to impose one corporate governance system
on another302 .
In postulating this criticism, one strong dissent suggests how culture can be
factored into governance. It states that cross-cultural psychology can provide means of
evaluating international cultural differences and assessing their effect on corporate
governance systems. By using values, which refer to desirable goals and modes of
conduct to promote these goals, cultural differences can be grouped into predefined
concepts that transcend nations. With the aid of numerical values, statistics can be
obtained on national corporate governance systems and this can answer the question of
which national culture is fundamental.
The point being driven home is that the existence of divergent cultures causes
fundamental concepts of governance to occupy different levels of importance and this
makes the likelihood of convergence impractical. One example of how corporate culture
differences can lead to a deadlock was the failure by the European Union (EU) to adopt
301
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its draft fifth directive that attempted to harmonize corporate law and especially
governance practices amongst European member countries. This failure was blamed on
cultural differences303 . The attempted exercise led to bitter feuds amongst the members
and an expert panel concluded that differences in national cultures made the
harmonization impossible304 .
In further criticism of the scholarship of convergence, it has been asserted that no
ideal structure for governance exists. Different forms will work well in different countries
at different times. The bottom line is that each system finds its own way of holding those
who direct the corporations accountable to other entities or persons. Whether it’s to the
shareholders in the Anglo-American model of the United States or United Kingdom, or
the supervisory board in Germany or by elevating governance to national culture in
Japan305 .
In response to the global convergence advocacy scholarship suggesting that this
convergence will replicate the American system, it has been criticized for not being
supported by empirical data nor having a truly global analysis306 . The response is that
even if the systems were to converge, they would not necessarily follow the best one307 .
To their credit, the scholars advocating for convergence to the United States system admit
that a single model is unlikely to emerge even though the trend continues in that
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direction308 . Convergence may very well occur in financial accounting and disclosure
standards but it won't be easy in corporate governance309 .
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This thesis introduced the general elements of corporate governance and the variety of
national corporate governance systems that exist. Their differences can be accounted for
at two levels. Firstly they are distinguishable by the attributes of the legal jurisdiction to
which they belong to, be it common law or civil law. Secondly, even within similar legal
jurisdictions countries differ at individual levels. Important national differences exist in
law and practice. Scholars have further attributed these differences to legal, cultural,
political and social factors. What is certain is that these differences have led to
competition at corporate and national levels. The result of which has led countries to
compete by incorporating best practices to their corporate governance system310 . After
all, investors will be attracted by markets with the most open shareholder governance
structure and will be repelled by low dividends, shareholder gagging or weak disclosure
laws311 . Corporate governance does matter to individual investors, institutional investors,
local or multinational corporations, nations and at a general international level.
This thesis has also shown that the implications are clear. For investors, it is
imperative that they become familiar with different governance systems. Companies
seeking to raise capital abroad and investors diversifying their portfolios with foreign
310
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investment must deal with corporate governance practices in multiple jurisdictions312 .
The ideal solution, especially for institutional investors who have the economic power, is
to conduct their own research. Individual investors can rely on the services of brokerage
firms or several other firms managing investment portfolios. But as long as investors look
beyond their borders for investment opportunities they will need to go forum shopping
for host countries that have attractive laws. To a large extent, the laws they will be
concerned with define the corporate governance systems. Corporate governance does
matter.
For the multinational corporation, whether they are located in countries that have
a strong or weak enforcement mechanism, the importation of best practices of
governance practices should be the standard practice. The activities of multinational
corporations are increasingly drawing attention and watchdogs in the form of pressure
groups and the press are seeing to that. Only corporations with good corporate
governance will have the social responsibility and ability to be concerned with a variety
of issues like the environment, fair wages and child labor. These issues are not only of
interest to the shareholders but are also important to the well being of the corporation.
At national level, corporate governance takes on even more importance.
Developed nations face the challenge of constantly refining their practices in order to
311
312
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have a competitive edge in a global environment where cross border transactions are the
norm. Whether this competition will lead to convergence is a theory that is being floated.
There is evidence of national governance systems making changes in order to attract
more investors but the question of whether this will lead to convergence into any single
model of corporate governance is currently unsupported by empirical data.
For developing and transitional economies, the notion of corporate governance
goes hand in hand with good public governance and positive economic policies in order
to be a vital element for private sector development. Good corporate governance is much
harder to achieve in a climate of corruption, poor public and economic governance. The
challenge is improve all three in order to attract investors.
The OECD principles of corporate governance have laid down minimum
standards to be complied with by member and non-member states. However, they ignore
the existence of different national systems of governance molded on nation’s varied
backgrounds. Neither do they consider the fact that countries are at different stages of
development.

The notion of ‘regional corporate governance systems’ discussed in the

fourth chapter seems ideal. This would make the principles seem less as an imposition
and provide a better standard to be aspired by countries in regions that share a common
heritage.
That said, so far the OECD principles remain the only effort towards an attempt to
formulate a global corporate governance system. Though they have been criticized, they
remain a good effort largely because they expound a system based on universal principles
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of accountability, responsibility and transparency that should be the cornerstone of every
corporate governance system no matter the legal, economic, political or social
background.
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